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While enhanced cybersecurity options, mainly based around 
cryptographic functions, are needed overall speed and 
performance of a healthcare network may take priority in many 
circumstances. As such the overall security metrics and 
performance of those cryptographic functions in their embedded 
context needs to be understood in detail. Understanding those 
metrics has been the main aim of this research activity. This 
research reports on an implementation of one network security 
technology, Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), to evaluate 
security performance. This research simulates sensitive 
healthcare information being transferred over a network, and 
then measures data delivery times with selected security 
parameters for various communication types running under 
different operating systems. Based on our performance 
experiments, this research has indicated a number of network 
security metrics that need to be considered when designing and 
managing network security for healthcare-specific or non-
healthcare-specific systems from security, performance and 
manageability perspectives. This research proposes distinct 
recommendations based on our test results to contribute to 
selecting the appropriate security metrics for achieving the 
correct balance between network security and performance. 
Keywords— network secuirty metrics and performance; 
network security; e-health systems; security for healthcare systems. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the 21st century, Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) and its artefacts provide the critical 
infrastructure needed to support most essential services, 
including the information services of the healthcare sector. The 
use of computer-based information systems and associated 
telecommunications network infrastructure to process, 
transmit, and store healthcare information plays a significant 
role in improving healthcare service quality and productivity.  
Despite e-health‘s potential to improve the management of 
healthcare services, electronic healthcare records may 
inadvertently pose new challenges to control and manage  
sensitive healthcare data, if not planed, designed and managed 
effectively. The protection of electronic healthcare information 
security is critical to the successful implementation of any e-
health initiative. Addressing security and privacy concerns to 
maintain trust becomes even more prominent while moving 
healthcare systems to the cloud computing environment.  
The National eHealth Security & Access Framework 
(NESAF) [1] has been developed to provide guidance in the 
design and implementation of secure healthcare systems by the 
National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA). NEHTA 
has been established by Australia’s Federal Government to 
accelerate the adoption of e-health by developing guidance, 
specifications, standards and infrastructure necessary for 
uptake and support of e-health initiatives. NESAF provides 
high-level advice in relation to the consideration of 
implementation of the virtual private network (VPN) 
technology to protect sensitive healthcare information in 
transit. It is well-known that a VPN is a network security 
mechanism which can be used to mitigate network-based 
attacks such as man-in-the-middle, IP spoofing and port 
scanning attacks. NESAF recommends the adoption of VPNs, 
if there are many communications that need to be secured 
between two communicating parties.  
The purpose of this research is to provide technical insights 
on the network security metrics and performance requirements 
that can be appropriately managed and controlled at the 
network level to protect the transmission of sensitive health 
information across untrusted or public networks.  In particular, 
this paper describes one security mechanism implemented at 
the network level, viz. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec). 
IPSec can provide data packet security for the application layer 
without any modifications to applications or related protocols. 
This research contributes to an understanding of appropriate 
selections of network security metrics to meet security and 
performance objectives for the management of healthcare 
systems in a meaningful and practical way. 
In achieving a high level of information assurance in 
healthcare systems, one should implement appropriate security 
controls at all levels of health information system architecture 
to ensure data protection from both internal and external 
threats. Furthermore, in addressing an overall trusted healthcare 
information system, one should take a holistic approach to 
address security and privacy concerns when data is at rest, 
during processing and in transit [2].  Owing to the paper length 
limitation, this paper focuses on the IPSec implementation, 
which has been widely used to provide confidentiality, 
integrity, peer authentication, replay protection, traffic analysis 
protection and access control.  The reason this research selects 
IPSec VPN as a network security solution is that IPSec can be 
used to provide application layer security without 
modifications to any applications on the client or the server 
system.  IPSec is also a mature technology and readily 
available and supported by most operating systems and 
dedicated networking devices. 
This paper begins with an overview of the benefits and 
challenges associated with the adoption of e-health. Section II 
investigates the use of VPN technology for healthcare systems 
management. Section III details our IPSec implementation 
design. Section IV reports our test results. Then an analysis of 
the IPSec implementation and recommendations are included 
in Section V. Finally, the conclusion is drawn and future work 
is outlined in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
There are numerous security mechanisms which can be 
seen as possible solutions in addressing the transmission 
security for healthcare-specific or non-healthcare-specific 
systems.  For example, VPN can be used as one network 
security technology for protecting data confidentiality and 
integrity over a public network through the use of 
cryptography.  There are various types of VPN as stated by 
Frankel et al. [3].  Table I lists various types of VPN solutions 
in line with the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference 
model.  
TABLE I.  VARIOUS VPN TECHNOLOGIES IN LINE WITH OSI  
VPN Technology OSI Layer 
Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) 
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) Data Link 
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) Network 
Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Transport 
OpenPGP and Secure Shell (SSH) Application  
This paper focuses on the security controls and management of 
healthcare systems through the use of IPSec VPN technology. 
The use of VPN has been commonly cited by numerous 
studies [4-11] for the protection of transmission of sensitive 
healthcare data over public networks. They recommended the 
use of VPN as very high-level strategic advice; however, they 
provided no detailed practical information on the 
implementation of VPNs for healthcare systems management. 
Critically, they provided no advice on achieving an appropriate 
balance between network security and performance for the 
security controls and management of healthcare systems.  
 Recently “cloud computing” has been an emerging 
paradigm that enables full ICT-based services to be delivered 
over the Internet, including healthcare related services. 
Adopting cloud computing has the potential of increasing the 
scalability, agility, flexibility, resource utilisation and cost 
effectiveness of infrastructure. With numerous compelling 
benefits, many industries have jumped on the bandwagon of 
the adoption of cloud computing, including the healthcare 
sector.  Undoubtedly, health information is highly sensitive by 
its nature. Addressing security and privacy concerns becomes 
even more prominent while moving e-health systems to a cloud 
computing environment. The authors concur with  Podrigues et 
al. [7] that security and privacy concerns need to be considered 
before shifting healthcare systems to the cloud environment. In 
fact, the adoption of VPN technology is still recommended by 
numerous studies [4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11] for protecting access to 
cloud-based healthcare systems. This research addresses an 
appropriate balance between network security and performance 
with detailed technical advice and guidance on the IPSec VPN 
implementation for healthcare systems management in a 
meaningful and practical manner. 
III. OUR IPSEC VPN IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN  
This section describes IPSec operation modes and 
parameters with three different case scenarios to simulate the 
transmission of healthcare information between healthcare 
organisations and healthcare professionals over a network.  
A. IPSec Communicaton Types and Operation Modes 
This research implements and evaluates the three types of 
IPSec communications: Host-to-Host (Fig.1), Site-to-Site 
(Fig.2), and Host-to-Site communications (Fig.3). IPSec can be 
configured to operate either in “Tunnel” or “Transport” mode. 
Use of each mode depends on the requirements and 
implementation of IPSec. Transport mode is typically used for 
Host-to-Host communications. Transport mode can provide 
data security to IP payload (data), whereas Tunnel mode can 
provide the protection for the entire IP packet containing IP 
header and payload. Tunnel mode is achieved by encapsulating 
the original IP packet in another new IP packet, which is the IP 
tunnelling concept.  Tunnel mode is normally used for Host-to-
Site or Site-to-Site communications.  
1) Host-to-Host  
 
Fig. 1. IPSec Communication – Host-to-Host 
IPSec Host-to-Host communications provide end-to-end 
network security when two healthcare professionals need to 
exchange sensitive healthcare information over an open 
network, based on Transport mode, as illustrated in Fig. 1.  
2) Router-to-Router (Site-to-Site) 
 
Fig. 2. IPSec Communication – Site-to-Site 
IPSec Site-to-Site communications provide secure 
communication channels for the exchange of confidential 
healthcare information between two healthcare organisations 
based on Tunnel mode, as shown in Fig. 2. 
3) Host-to-Router (Host-to-Site)  
 
Fig. 3. IPSec communication – Host-to-Site 
IPSec Host-to-Site communications support data protection 
for a remote healthcare professional, who is accessing 
healthcare information stored at a healthcare organisation, 
based on Tunnel mode, as illustrated in Fig. 3.  
B. Selection of IPSec Security Parameters 
The key components of IPsec implementation include 
Authentication Header (AH), Encapsulating Security Payload 
(ESP) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE).  AH is defined in 
RFC 4302 to provide authentication for data integrity against 
replay attacks. ESP is defined in RFC 4303 to support data 
confidentiality and integrity against replay and packet sniffing 
attacks. AH and ESP can be used alone or together to provide 
trusted transmission of sensitive data. This study selects the 
ESP mode of IPSec implementation, as ESP can be used for 
data authentication, integrity and confidentiality. For 
simplicity, pre-shared keys are selected in our IPSec 
implementation to authenticate the communicating parties and 
to generate session keys. To establish an IPSec connection, two 
communicating parties must negotiate and agree on a set of 
security algorithms. A set of security algorithms include the 
encryption and authentication algorithms used with the key 
sizes to protect data transmitted between the two 
communicating parties, which is the primary function of IKE.  
This research measures security performance on three 
different case scenarios with the selected standard data 
encryption and authentication algorithms combined with 
various key sizes.  The selected and supported encryption 
algorithms include Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple 
Data Encryption Standard (3DES) and Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) with a key size of 128 bits. Other encryption 
algorithms, such as Blowfish and Serpent, are not selected for 
standardisation and provision reasons. The selected and 
supported authentication algorithms include Message Digest 5 
(MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) and the SHA2 
family including SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512. These 
selected security parameters are restricted to the encryption and 
authentication algorithms with key sizes supported by our 
experimental devices and operating systems. Please note that 
DES and MD5 can no longer be considered secure algorithms 
nowadays, they are still used in our experiments for backward 
compatibility and comparative analysis purposes. 
Our experimental devices include a client host and a file 
server host as well as two routers. The hardware specifications 
are list in Table II.  
TABLE II.  HARDWARE SPECIFICATIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL DEVICES 
2 Hosts 2 Routers 
CPU: Intel i7-3770 Processor  
(8M   Cache, 3.70 GHz * 8 cores)  with 
AES hardware encryption accelerator   
RAM: 16 GB  
Cisco 2911 Integrated 
Services Router with 
embedded encryption 
hardware acceleration 
IV. TEST DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Some medical imaging may contain multiple high-
resolution or 3D images, such as Digital Imaging and 
Communications in Medicine (DICOM) files tend to be large 
in size. Based on file sizes of images from various imaging 
modalities [12], a file size of a digital radiography (up to 3000 
x 3000 pixels) is up to 18 MB, a digital mammography image 
(up to 3328 x 40960 pixels) is 27 MB. For example, 
performing a mammography study may need four images, so 
the total image size is 108MB.  A magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) or computed tomography (CT) scans may include 
hundreds of slices and so the total image size becomes even 
larger. A file size of 300 Megabytes (MB) is used consistently 
in all of our performance tests.     
A. Experiment for Host-to-Host Communcations 
In this particular experiment, both hosts were installed with 
the Linux operating system (Desktop Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit 
operating system). “Openswan” is used as an IPSec 
implementation on the Linux operating system. IPSec is 
configured on both hosts as two independent security hosts 
with Openswan operating in Transport mode. Openswan 
supports standard data encryption algorithms (DES, 3DES and 
AES-128), but not Blowfish, and authentication algorithms 
(MD5 and SHA1).  
This experiment measures data packet delivery time, that is, 
the amount of time from the data being encrypted and 
authenticated at the source host to the data being decrypted and 
verified at the destination host. The test results are presented in 
Fig.4.    
 
Fig. 4. Performance Test for the Host-to-Host Communication 
The test results indicate that AES-128 performs the best 
compared to DES and 3DES. The best security choice in this 
scenario is AES-128/SHA1, however, its performance is 
slightly slower than AES-128/MD5. 
 
Fig. 5. Comparative Performance between Linux and Windows  
B. Experiment for the Site-to-Site Communications  
In this test, IPSec is implemented on both sites’ routers to 
create a secure IPSec tunnel over the network to provide 
transmission security. Both hosts are based on the Ubuntu 
Linux system. IPSec is not configured on the two hosts.  This is 
a typical case in implementing Tunnel mode which protects 
sensitive data transmission across a public network via a secure 
tunnel. In this case, the protection boundary is between the two 
endpoints of the tunnel.    
The routers used for our experiments only support some 
encryption algorithms including DES, 3DES, AES128 and 
authentication algorithms with MD5, SHA1 and SHA2 family 
(SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512).  
This test measures packet delivery time from when the first 
data packet leaves the source host until the last pack is received 
at the destination. Namely, this test measures the amount of 
time from the first data packet leaving the source host and then 
being encrypted, authenticated and encapsulated to enter into 
the tunnel until the last data packet is de-encapsulated, verified 
and decrypted at the endpoint of the tunnel, then forwarded to 
the destination. The test results are shown in Fig. 6.    
 
Fig. 6. Performance Test for Site-to-Site (Host are based on Linux) 
In this experiment, the results clearly reveal that AES-
128/SHA256 performs the best. The performance, however, 
decreases when the key size of the authentication algorithm is 
increased. The best security set is AES-128/SHA512, which 
performs even better than the less secure sets DES/MD5 and 
3DES/MD5. Actually, the experimental devices we used 
support AES. That is, some of AES complex computation is 
carried out on hardware to accelerate the performance.  
This experiment also tests the case where the two hosts are 
operating under the Windows system. The IPSec setting for 
Site-to-Site remains intact. Fig. 7 shows an identical pattern as 
Fig. 6, in which the best performance is AES-128/SHA256. 
But the performance decreases when the key size of the 
authentication algorithm is increased. The best security set is 
still AES-128/SHA512 with a slower performance than AES-
128/SHA256.   
The test (Fig. 6 and Fig7) shows that the operating systems 
of the hosts also contribute to overall performance.  The 
comparative results from this experiment reveal a better 
performance when the hosts are based on the Linux system 
than on the Windows system.  
  
 
Fig. 7. Performance Test for Site-to-Site (Hosts are based on Windows) 
C. Experiment for Host-to-Site Communications 
With this experiment, IPSec is configured on a client host 
based on Linux and a Cisco router, but not on the file server. 
The operation mode for this experiment is based on Tunnel 
mode. The two tunnel endpoints are between the source host 
and the Cisco router. With this particular test, we only tested 
the host based on Linux, as the Cisco VPN router is only 
compatible with the host on Windows via the Cisco IPSec 
VPN client. However, the  Cisco IPSec VPN client is 
incompatible with our Windows system. 
The encryption algorithms supported by Openswan 
installed on the host and the router include DES, 3DES, AES-
128 with the authentication algorithms MD5, SHA1, SHA256, 
SHA384 and SHA512.  
 
Fig. 8. Performance Test for Host-to-Site Communication 
This test measures packet delivery time from when the first 
data packet leaves the source host until the last pack reaches 
the destination. That is, this time is measured from the time the 
first data packet is encrypted, authenticated and encapsulated 
until the last data packet is de-encapsulated, verified and 
decrypted at the tunnel endpoint, and then forwarded to the 
destination.  
Fig. 8 shows that the combination of DES/MD5 presents 
the best performance with the lowest level of security. If a high 
level of security with a performance objective is required, 
AES-128/SHA1 is the best choice, because there is only a 
trivial delay between AES-128/MD5 and AES-128/SHA1.  
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 
This section evaluates the performance of IPSec 
implementation from security, performance and manageability 
perspectives.  
A. Security 
In relation to data encryption services, some algorithms are 
considered as being more secure than others. DES is regarded 
as potentially obsolete and less secure than 3DES. 3DES is 
based on the same algorithm as DES by chaining three 
instances of DES with three different keys. However, 3DES is 
computationally intensive, in particular in a software-based 
implementation. Our test results reveal that AES performs 
better than 3DES across all cases, which is also affirmed by 
Alanazi et al. [13]. They conduct a comparative study between 
DES, 3DES and AES from efficiency, flexibility and security 
perspectives. AES is considered more modern and secure than 
DES and 3DES because of larger block size, longer keys being 
used. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate to select AES over 
DES and 3DES when a high security level is required for the 
transmission of sensitive health information across a public 
network. The AES is therefore a desirable choice. DES or 
3DES is used only when AES is unavailable.  
With respect to authentication services, MD5 is considered 
the less secure among other algorithms, partially due to MD5 
creates a shorter condensed representation (message digest) of 
the data than any form in the SHA family [14]. MD5 has been 
excluded from the approved Hash algorithms of the Federal 
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) [15].  Nevertheless, 
MD5 is still supported by Linux-based and Windows-based 
operating systems. MD5 can be used for backward 
compatibility purposes. An appropriate selection of SHA 
algorithms depends on the key length; longer key sizes provide 
higher levels of security.  
B. Performance 
One of the key factors in selecting an appropriate security 
level against performance objectives is that longer key sizes of 
encryption and authentication algorithms provide better 
security at the cost of performance, as a rule of thumb. Our 
performance test results affirm such a principle. While raising 
the security level by increasing key sizes, packet delivery times 
are also increased, as shown in Fig. 9.  
AES performs obviously faster than 3DES and DES in our 
experiments. By design AES is the successor of DES as 
standard symmetric encryption algorithm to improve security 
and performance. Additionally, using Intel ® Core i7 
processors can accelerate the performance of the AES 
algorithm, as Core i7 processors with a set of instructions to 
execute some of the computation of the AES algorithm with 
hardware. 
This research discovered that the operating systems that the 
hosts are based upon also contribute to overall performance by 
conducting IPSec implementation. That is, IPSec performs 
better when the hosts are based on the Linux-based system than 
on the Windows-based system. The Linux-based operating 
system is less resource-intensive than the Windows-based 
operating system.  
 
Fig. 9. Security vs. Performance for Site-to-Siste Communication 
It is necessary to have an appropriate labelling mechanism 
to classify the levels of confidentiality, integrity and priority 
for the transmission of healthcare data, in order to choose an 
appropriate security level with optimal performance.  The 
authors propose a metric scheme to select appropriate security 
parameters according to the requirement for data 
confidentiality, integrity and delivery priority, as shown in 
Table III. 
TABLE III.  PROPOSED SECURITY AND DELIVERY PRIORITY METRICS   
 High security Medium security Low security 
Confidentiality  AES-256 AES-192 AES-128 
Integrity SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 
Delivery Low priority Medium priority High priority 
Best practice AES-128/SHA256 AES-192/SHA384 AES-128/SHA512 
AES is deemed more secure and performs better than DES 
and 3DES, owing to using larger block size and longer keys. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that AES is the default 
encryption algorithm for protecting confidential information.    
C. Manageability 
A decision on the selection of Transport or Tunnel mode 
depends upon which communication type Host-to-Host, Site-
to-Site or Host-to-Site.  IPsec can be implemented in all hosts 
on a network or on certain routers. Implementing IPSec on all 
hosts can provide end-to-end security; however, it becomes an 
administrative burden to operate with a large number of hosts 
on the network. It is even more advantageous to select Tunnel 
mode, if routers have hardware-based encryption accelerator to 
provide greater IPsec packet throughput compared with 
software-based encryption solutions. Implementing IPSec on 
certain routers is more efficient than on all hosts, but data is 
only protected during transmission across the network. In 
general, Tunnel mode is implemented for the Host-to-Site type 
of communication, because the IPSec encryption, 
authentication and encapsulation process is performed by the 
host and the router. It is realistic to decide that if the intended 
destination is located behind the router is running Web, file or 
database services, then the destination does not and should not 
process IPSec data packets.  Table IV summarises our 
comparison analysis between different operation modes and 
communication types.  




Mode Advantage Disadvantage 
Host-to-Host Transport End-to-end security Low throughput   Low manageability 
Host-to-Site Tunel Medium throughput  Medium manageability 
Protection between 
tunnel endpoints 
Site-to-Site Tunel High throughput   High manageability 
Protection between 
tunnel endpoints 
The limitation of this study includes our performance 
experiments are conducted on a closed network environment 
and, therefore, the results of these performance tests do not 
reflect any network delays observed in real networks. This 
study, however, still provides critical factors that should be 
considered in achieving an appropriate balance between 
network security and performance when designing and 
managing healthcare-specific and non-healthcare-specific 
systems. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The significance of this research is the provision of network 
security metrics and performance with practical technical 
guidance to those involved in planning, designing and 
managing network security for any healthcare-specific or non-
healthcare-specific system. Implementing security in healthcare 
systems may seem necessary, but performance may have to be 
considered in the light of delivery priorities.  Particularly, 
performance and manageability of network security control 
needs to be considered in large-scale enterprise deployments.  
This research proposes the following distinct suggestions 
based on our test results for the contribution of the IPSec VPN 
implementation: 
 An understanding of selecting appropriate metrics for 
meeting security and performance objectives for any 
healthcare-specific or non-healthcare-specific system, 
including: security algorithm (authentication and 
encryption), key length, operating system and hardware.  
 Selection guidelines between IPSec Transport and IPSec 
Tunnel mode depends upon the type of communication 
from a viewpoint of performance and manageability, as 
listed in Table IV. 
 A design of a labelling mechanism to classify the levels 
of confidentiality, integrity and delivery priority in 
selecting appropriate security controls, as summarised in 
Table III. 
 A recommendation for the Linux-based operating system 
over Windows-based operating system for the IPSec 
implementation, as the Windows-based system requires 
more system resources, based on our experimental results.  
 A recommendation for the selection of devices (routers 
and computers) that should support hardware-based 
encryption/decryption acceleration in achieving security, 
but does not degrade performance significantly.  
Modern healthcare systems are increasingly moving 
towards a “Cloud Computing” environment, which heavily 
depends upon Domain Name System (DNS) for the 
identification of relevant information services.  As such, this 
research envisages that there are concerns relating to the trust 
nature of the Internet’s naming and numbering systems.  This 
research will continue to investigate and evaluate the 
integration and interaction of other appropriate security 
measures, if they can be readily incorporated into a cloud-
based healthcare system in a trustworthy manner. 
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